THE
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
FEBRUARY 1946

VOLUME 13

NUMBER 2

BOARD OF EDITORS
Jom¢ D.

RIircAR F. BABcOcK, Editor-in-Chief
GEORGE W. OvERT ON

LAWYER

Associates
THADDEUS EumsAiKS

MARY ELIZABETH PARMER
DAVID PARSON

ERNEST GREENBERGER

PAUL

Louis LEVIT

HERBERT

STUART B ERNSTEIN

H.

RE D, JR.

E.

RUBEN

ROBERT L. JAmEs

Business Editor

E. W. PUTTXAMMER
Faculty Adviser

RECENT CASES
Federal Jurisdiction in "Diversity Cases"-Application of Local Statute Prohibiting Deficiency Judgments to Out-of-State Transaction-Refusal of State
Court To Take Jurisdiction of Suit for Deficiency Judgment as Binding on Federal Court in Same State-[Federall.--The defendant purchased a tract of land
in Virginia from the plaintiff, a Virginia resident, taking a deed and executing
notes for the unpaid part of the purchase price and a deed of trust of the land as
security for the payment of the notes. The entire transaction took place in
Virginia. When the defendant defaulted on one of the notes and the proceeds of
the foreclosure sale of the land were not sufficient to discharge the notes, the
plaintiff sued the defendant, a North Carolina resident, for the deficiency in a
North Carolina court. A North Carolina statute provides that deficiency judgments will not be allowed on mortgages or deeds of trust given as security for
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the purchase of land.' The lower court sustained a demurrer to the complaint
and this decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, holding that the statute restricted the jurisdiction of the courts of North Carolina
and prohibited an action to recover upon notes secured by land in other states.2
The plaintiff then brought an action for the deficiency in the federal court for
the western district of North Carolina. The district court gave a judgment to
the plaintiff for the unpaid portion of the notes.3 On appeal to the Circuit Court
of Appeals, held, affirmed. Since the Supreme Court of North Carolina construed the statute as procedural and a limitation on the jurisdiction of state
courts, the statute was not binding on the federal court sitting in North Caro4
lina. Angel v. Bullingon.
Several statutes have been enacted, limiting the right to receive a deficiency
judgment after foreclosure. Although these statutes differ in the severity of the
restriction, the more recent laws either give the mortgagor a set-off in the
amount of the reasonable or fair market value of the property, if it is greater
than the sale price,5 or deny the right to a deficiency judgment altogether under
certain or all circumstances.6 Generally, courts have held local statutes limiting
I The pertinent provision of the statute is as follows:
"In all sales of real property by mortgagees and/or trustees under powers of sale contained
in any mortgage or deed of trust executed after February 6, 1933 .... the mortgagee or trustee
or holder of the notes secured by such mortgage or deed of trust shall not be entitled to a
deficiency judgment on account of such mortgage, deed of trust or obligation secured by the
same ..... "N.C. Gen. Stat. (Michie, 1943) § 45-36.

2Bullington v. Angel,

22o N.C.

18, 16 S.E.

2d

411 (1941).

3 Angel v. Bullington, 56 F. Supp. 372 (D.C.N.C., '944).
4 15o F. 2d

679 (C.C.A. 4 th, 1945), cert. granted, 66 Sup. Ct. 231 ('945).

'Ala. L. 1935, No. 146 p. 184 (emergency measure, expired October 1, 1939); Cal. Civ.
Proc. Code (Deering, 1941) § 58oa; Ga. 1935, No. 412 p. 381; Idaho Laws Ann. (Courtright,
1943) § 9-io8; Mich. Stat. Ann. (Henderson, 1945 Supp.) § 27.13315; N.J. Rev. Stat. (i937)
tit. 2, c. 65, § 3; N.Y. Civ. Prac. Ann. (Gilbert-Bliss, i944) §§ IO83-a, IO83-b; Okla. Stat.
Ann. (194i) tit. i2, § 686; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, '944 Supp.) tit. 12 §§ 2621.1-2621.11; S.C.
Acts, 1933, No. 264 p. 35o, held unconstitutional in Fidelity-Bankers Trust Co. v. Little, 178
S.C. 133, 181 S.E. 913 (1935); S.D. Laws 1937, c. 208 p. 277. North Carolina also has a fair
market value statute applicable to deficiency claims under any mortgage or deed of trust,
note Ii, infra.
6 In Oregon (Oregon Comp. L. Ann. [i94o] § 9-5o5), and South Dakota (S.D. Code [r939]
§ 39,o3o8), the statute is applicable only to purchase-money mortgages. A similar California
statute was declare unconstitutional in Hales v. Snowden, 19 Cal. App. 2d 366 (1937). In
Nebraska a deficiency judgment is not allowed on any mortgage or deed or trust, Neb. Rev.
Stat. (1943) § 25-2139. In Arizona a deficiency judgment is not allowed unless the plaintiff
proves that at the time the mortgage was executed the value of the property was not in excess
of the amount remaining due, or that the depreciation in value was caused by either the original
mortgagor or the defendant, Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) § 62-517. In Louisiana a deficiency judgment is prohibited where the appraisement laws have been waived by the mortgagor, La. Gen.
Stat. Ann. (Dart, 1939) §§ 5021.6, 5021.7. In Montana a deficiency judgment is not allowed
unless the mortgage was given as payment or renewal of an allowed and approved mortgage
or lien on the realty subsisting at the time of death of a decedent owner, Mont. Rev. Codes
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the rights of mortgagees inapplicable to cases where the land was situated and
the notes or bonds were executed in another state.7 It is said that the statute
sought to be applied was intended only to protect those who own land within
the state,' and that the promise to pay was governed by the law of the state
where the notes were executedf
The North Carolina Supreme Court's construction of the statute in the
principal case is questionable. Although states need not open their courts to
claims the enforcement of which would be contrary to the policy of the state,10
it is doubtful whether this statute was intended to restrict the jurisdiction of
the state courts, where the transaction and the property were outside the state.
The same session of the North Carolina legislature which enacted this purchasemoney mortgage statute also passed a deficiency judgment statute of the fairmarket-value type, applicable to sales under any mortgage or deed of trust.,,
Unlike the fair-market-value statute, the purchase-money mortgage law was
applicable only to mortgages or trust deeds executed after the passage of the
statute.u These facts suggest that the purchase-money mortgage statute was
Ann. (i935) § 10,255. The Arkansas court held unconstitutional a statute providing that the
plaintiff in a foreclosure suit would not be allowed a decree unless he filed a stipulation that
he would bid the amount of the debt. Adams v. Spillyards, 187 Ark. 641, 6i S.W. 2d 686 (1933).
7An Oregon statute similar to the statute in the principal case was held inapplicable in a
suit for a deficiency judgment following foreclosure of a purchase-money mortgage on land
situated in Montana. McGirl v. Brewer, 132 Ore. 422, 28o Pac. 5o8 (1929), aff'd on rehearing,
132 Ore. 432, 285 Pac. 2o8 (1930). A California statute providing that there could be but one
action by a mortgagee, thus requiring the claim for deficiency to be determined in the foreclosure proceeding, was held inapplicable where the land was situated in Oregon. Felton v.
West, i02 Cal. 266, 36 Pac. 676 (1894). A Minnesota statute prohibiting suits for deficiency
judgments during the period of redemption was held inapplicable to a suit on notes secured by
a mortgage on Iowa land. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Conley, 194 Minn. 4z, 259
N.W. 390 (i935). The fair-market-value type of deficiency-judgment statute has been held
inapplicable to mortgages on out-of-state lands. Franklin Soc. for Home Building and Savings
v. Weseman, 170 Misc. Iooo, io N.Y.S. 2d 247 (ig3); Provident Savings Bank & Trust Co. v.
SteinmetZ, 27o N.Y. 129, 2oo N.E. 669 (936); see Fidelity-Bankers Trust Co. v. Little, 178
S.C. 133, i8x S.E. 913 (i935); cf. Stewart v. Eaton, 287 Mich. 466, 283 N.W. 65i (1939); see
Friedman, The Enforcement of Personal Liability on Mortgage Debts in New York, 5i Yale
L.J. 382, 412 (942); 25 U. of Cal. L. Rev. 576, 587 (i937).
9See Franklin Soc. for Home Buildings & Savings v. Weseman, 170 Misc. 1ooo, 1003, 10

N.Y.S. 2d 247, 250 (z939); Fidelity-Bankers & Trust Co. v. Little, 178 S.C. 133, z65, i8i
S.E. 93, 924 (935).
9 See McGirl v. Brewer, 132 Ore. 422, 426, 280 Pac. 508, 509 (1929), aff'd on rehearing, 132
Ore. 432, 438, 285 Pac. 2o8, 210 (i93o); Porte v. Polachek, zo Misc. 891, 894, 27o N.Y.
Supp. 807, 8o (i934).
10 See Griffin v. M!Coach, 313 U.S. 498, 5o6 (941); Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of
the Conflict of Laws 129 (1942); Goodrich, Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts, 36 W. Va.

L. Q. 156 (i93o).

IxN.C. Gen. Stat. (Michie, 1943) § 45-34. The constitutionality of this statute was upheld
in Richmond Mortgage and Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co., 300 U.S. 124

(0937).

12Note

i, supra.
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designed to discourage prospective purchasers from buying land on small cash
margins. It seems probable that such a legislative policy was directed only
against transactions involving North Carolina property. 3 Thus, since the statute was not directed at out-of-state transactions involving land outside the
state, the rights of the parties should have been determined by the law of
Virginia. Though the applicability of the "place of contracting" doctrine may
be questionable under some circumstances, 4 it appears that in this case the
reasonable expectations of the parties would be that the law governing their
transaction would be that of the state in which the notes were executed and the
property was situated. 5 In an earlier decision, involving the capacity of a
married woman to sign notes, the North Carolina Supreme Court refused to
apply North Carolina law when the notes were executed outside the state even
6
though the land was situated in North Carolina.'
The plaintiff's suit in the federal court posed the question whether the state
court's refusal to take jurisdiction precluded the federal court from granting the
relief asked for by the plaintiff. The federal court reasoned that since the
statute as construed by the state court was procedural, 7 it was not binding on
a federal court sitting in North Carolina. Although it was assumed that Erie R.
Co. v. Thompkins5 permitted federal courts to apply their own rules as to procedural matters, 9 in later cases the line between procedure and substance has
been largely erased. Federal courts now follow the state rule as to burden of
'3

See cases cited in notes 7 and 8, supra.

Cook, op. cit. supra, note 1o, c. 14. Cook observes that, "The other theories applicable in
determining the validity of contracts may be grouped under the general heading of (i)the
'place of performance' theory; (2) the 'intention of parties' theory; and (3)the 'proper law'
theory," ibid., at 347, n. 4; see McClintock, Beale on the Conflict of Law, 84 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
'4

309, 313 (1936); compare Rest., Conflict of Laws § 341, Comment a (i941).

SSee McGirl v. Brewer, 132 Ore. 432, 438, 285 Pac. 208, 211 (930), affirming on rehearing,
Ore. 422, 280 Pac. 5o8 (1929). Since the notes were executed in Virginia, the land was
located in Virginia, and it was provided that the notes were payable at a bank in Roanoke,
Virginia, it would appear that under any of the three theories listed by Cook (note 14, supra)
the law of Virginia would be the applicable law in the case; see Rheinstein, Methods of Legal
Thought and the Conflict of Laws: A Book Review, io Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 466, 476 (1943).
132

16 A suit was brought against a married woman on her note executed in South Carolina and
secured by a purchase-money mortgage on North Carolina land. The court applied South
Carolina law and held that she was liable on the notes, although the notes and mortgage would
have been voidable if executed in North Carolina. Wood v. Wheeler, iii N.C. 231, 16 S.E.
418 (1892).
X7 "The statute operates upon the adjective law of the state, which pertains to the practice
and procedure, or legal machinery by which the substantive law is made effective, and not upon
the substantive law itself." Bullington v. Angel, 22o N.C. i8, 20, i6 S.E. 2d 411, 412 (1941).

X83o4, U.S. 64 (1938).
'9

See r Moore, Federal Practice § 1.14, at io3 (1938).
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proof,2 contributory negligence,21 the parol evidence rule, the statute of limitations at law and in equity,23 and forum non conveniens24 Common to all these
extensions of the rule in the Erie case is the belief that when a suit is brought
in a federal court solely because of diversity of citizenship the substantial rights
and duties of the parties should be the same as if the suit had been brought in
the courts of the state in which the federal court sits.' s Because the state rule is
characterized "procedural" by state courts, it does not follow that the federal
6
court may apply its own rule.2
In the principal case, the refusal of the state court to take jurisdiction was
based upon a statute which had substantially altered the rights of mortgagees.
There is no suggestion that the statute was designed to prevent overcrowding
of the dockets of state courts. Since the statute did reflect a substantive policy
of the state, the Erie doctrine would seem to require the federal court to refuse
jurisdiction of the suit27 Although the exact issue raised in the principal case
2oCities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 3o8 U.S. 208 (1939); see Sampson v. Channell, iio F.
2d 754 (C.C.A. ist, 1940), Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 153,
155 (I944).
21

Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. xo9 (1943).

- Zell v. American Seating Co., 138 F. 2d 641 (C.C.A. 2d, 1943).
23Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 65 S. Ct. 1464 (1945).
24

Weiss v. Routh, i49 F. 2d 193 (C.C.A. 2d, 1945).

2sNote 28, infra.

26See Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 65 Sup. Ct. x464, 1470 (I945); Sampson v. Channell, zio F. 2d 754, 762 (C.C.A. Ist, 1940); Zell v. American Seating Co. 138 F.
2d 641, 643 (C.C.A. 2d, x943); Cook, op. cit. supra, note io, at x8g.
27 In the principal case the federal court reasoned that jurisdiction conferred upon the

federal courts by the "diversity clause" could not be taken away by state statute. In support
of this proposition the court cited decisions and texts written previous to the Erie case. Angel
v. Bullington, 150 F. 2d 679, 68o (C.C.A. 4 th, 1945).
The decisions of the lower federal courts are in conflict as to the applicability of the Erie doctrine to cases where the state courts would refuse to take jurisdiction. In a recent case, the
plaintiffs brought suit in the District Court for the Southern District of New York to recover
from the directors of a Virginia corporation the loss in value of five hundred shares of common
stock of the corporation. The district court dismissed the complaint on the merits after trial.
The Circuit Court of Appeals found that the case involved the "internal affairs" of a foreign
corporation, and held that, since the New York courts would have refused to assert jurisdiction, the district court should have refused to entertain the action. The court said, "It might
be argued that those considerations which will set a court in motion are peculiar and personal
to itself, and that it does not follow that what is enough to move a state court to act, should
be enough to move a federal ....but in dealing with the question at bar, we are to remember
the purpose of conformity in 'diversity cases.' It is that the accident of citizenship shall not
change the outcome, a purpose which extends as much to determining whether the court shall
act at all, as to how it shall decide, if it does." Weiss v. Routh, 149 F. 2d 193, i95 (C.C.A.
2d, 1945).

In an earlier case, the Circuit Court for the Seventh Circuit held that the district court
had jurisdiction over an action for wrongful death occurring in Michigan, notwithstanding an
Illinois statute which prohibited the bringing of any action in Illinois courts to recover dam-
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has not been decided by the United States Supreme Court, it is clear that the
Court considers a lower federal court in a diversity case as just "another court
of the State." This view was stated unequivocally in GuarantyTrust Co. of New
York v. York.28 In the principal case, however, the court distinguished the
Guarantycase by pointing out that there the cause of action arose in the state
of the forum, whereas in the present case the cause of action was based upon a
contract executed in another state.
It is not clear, however, why this distinction should make any difference in
the application of the doctrine in the Erie case. The distinction simply calls
attention to the conflict-of-laws problem in the principal case. The early uncertainty as to the application of the Erie rule to conflicts questions was resolved
by the decisions in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co.29 and Grifin v. McCoach;3° a lower federal court must follow the rule of the state in which the
federal court sits as to the proper law to be applied in a case where there is a
conflict-of-laws problem. In the present case, the decision of the North Carolina
court that the deficiency judgment statute was procedural and thus (as the law
of the forum) the properly applicable law in the case, was part of the substantive law of North Carolina as far as the federal court was concerned. 3'
The federal court intimated 32 that the North Carolina court's choice of North
ages for a death by wrongful act occurring outside the state. Stephenson v. Grand Trunk
Western R. Co., iio F. 2d 4oi (C.C.A. 7 th, 1940), cert. granted, 3io U.S. 623 (194o), but dismissed by agreement of the parties, 311 U.S. 720 (i94o); see 35 III. L. Rev. 35' (1940); Cook,
op. cit. supra, note io, at 133. The same court held that a foreign corporation could bring suit
in a federal district court in Indiana even though by Indiana statute the corporation could not
have brought suit in the state courts because of its failure to register with the secretary of
state. Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Barnett, in8 F. 2d 190 (C.C.A. 7 th, 194x); see 90
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 493 (1942).
Previous to the decision in the Erie case it had been suggested that federal courts should
refuse to take jurisdiction in diversity cases, if the bringing of the suit was contrary to the
public policy of the state in which the federal court sat. See Stewart v. Baltimore & Ohio R.
Co., i68 U.S. 445 (1897); Teas & Pacific R. Co. v. Cox, 145 U.S. 593 (1892). But see Swett v.
Givner, 5 F. Supp. 739 (E.D. Ill., i934).
28 "But since a federal court adjudicating a state-created right solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties is for that purpose, in effect, only another court of the state,
it cannot afford recovery if the right to recover is made unavailable by the state, nor can it
substantially affect the enforcement of the right as given by the state." 65 Sup. Ct. 1464, 1469
(1945).
2' 313 U.S. 487 (I94i).
30 313 U.S. 498 (i94i).
31Were not the decision of the state court viewed as part of the substantive law of the state,
it would be relatively easy for the federal court to justify the application of a different rule.
Thus, if the state court in a conflicts case applied the law of the forum by calling the issue
"procedural," the federal court might apply a different rule because the state court had labeled
the issue "procedural." For a discussion of this procedure-substance syllogism as it arises under
the Erie doctrine in conflict-of-laws cases, see Sampson v. Channell, iioF. 2d 754, 762 (C.C.A.
ist, 194o); Ailes, Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 39 Mich. L. Rev. 392, 408
(1941); Cook, op. cit. supra, note io, at 183. *
32Angel v. Bullington, i5o F. 2d 679, 68i (C.C.A.

4

th, 1945).
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Carolina law violated the full-faith-and-credit clause of the Federal Constitution.33 The inference is that federal courts are not bound by state court conflictof-laws decisions which are unconstitutional. But it is doubtful whether the
plaintiff would have been successful if, following the decision in the state supreme court, he had petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari alleging that the statute as interpreted by the state court violated the
full-faith-and-credit clause of the Federal Constitution. The Supreme Court has
greatly restricted the area within which state decisions concerning choice of
law will be held void because of conflict with the full-faith-and-credit clause, or
the due-process clause of the Constitution. 4 This policy is a logical parallel to
the extension of the Erie doctrine to conflict-of-laws questions. Choice of law
is a matter for the states to decide. Not only has the Supreme Court refused
to be an arbiter of state conflict-of-laws decisions by use of the full-faith-andcredit clause, but, by extension of the Erie rule, it has required the lower federal
courts to follow the state decisions as to the proper law in a conflicts case.
That in the principal case the identical facts and parties were present in both
the state and federal courts illustrates strikingly the identity of the rationale
behind the two doctrines.
The court's decision in the present case suggests that in spite of the Supreme
Court's apparent dislike of the diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts, those courts will not always conform to what is believed to be
an unreasonable decision of a state court. The fact that in this case the federal
court appears to have reached a more reasonable result than that reached by the
state court suggests that the application of the Erie doctrine to conflicts questions may have been an unfortunate extension of Mr. justice Brandeis' opinion
in Erie R. Co. v. Thompkins.5
U.S. Const. art. 4 §i.
to 1935 if a contract was entered into in one state the laws of that state governed
and another state could not refuse to enforce the contract, New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge,
246 U.S. 357 (1918), but, if the "place of contracting" was the state of the forum, then the
courts of that state were justified in refusing to apply the law of another state, Mutual Life
Ins. Co. of New York v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209 (1922). The Court no longer applies this mechanical rule-of-thumb in cases where it is alleged that the refusal to apply the law of another
state violates the full-faith-and-credit clause or the due-process clause of the Federal Constitution. A state may apply its own statute to a contract which was made in another state, and apparently the only requirement is that the state applying its own laws have a substantial interest at stake. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Com'n of California, 294 U.S. 532
(1935); Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 739 (x943); see Griffin v. McCoach, 313
3

34Previous

U.S. 498, 507 (1941); 11Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 75 (1943); see also Mr. Justice Stone's concurring
opinion in Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S.
145,163
(1932); but cf. Home Ins.
Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).

Although it is questionable whether the statute in the principal case was intended to apply
to the Virginia transaction, the maker of the notes was a resident of North Carolina, and it is
doubtful whether the Supreme Court would question the opinion of the North Carolina Supreme Court that the statute expressed a state policy designed to prevent any suit for a deficiency judgment from being brought in a North Carolina court.
3SIt has been maintained that since "state decisions in the conflict of laws are dealing with
fact situations which concern other states or foreign countries, national courts may take a

